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Levin: Rush v. Savchuk: Is the Seider Spoiled or Just Getting Harder?

RUSH v. SAVCHUK: IS THE SEIDER
SPOILED OR JUST GETTING HARDER?
The Supreme Court's landmark decision in International Shoe
Co. v. Washington' established the "minimum contacts" standard
for state-court assertion of personal jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants. In light of this flexible standard,2 considerations including a state's strong regulatory interest3 and its desire to avoid
financial detriment to itself 4 have been recognized as important factors in determining the propriety of jurisdiction. Application of the

principles of International Shoe also led to the development of
state long-arm statutes specifying activities falling within the ambit

of minimum contacts. 6 Thus, the "magical and medieval concepts

1. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The Supreme Court held that:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he
have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."

Id. at 316 (citations omitted).
2. Justice Stone, writing for the Court in International Shoe, rejected the attempts of earlier courts to define a quantitative standard for state-court assertion of in
personam jurisdiction:
It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line between those activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit,
and those which do not, cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative . ...
Whether due process is satisfied must depend.., upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the
laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.
Id. at 319 (citations omitted).
3. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 311-13 (1950).
4. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
5. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 33, 52
(1978); Comment, Attachment of "Obligations"-A New Chapterin Long-Arm Jurisdiction, 16 BUFFALO L. REv. 769, 770 (1967).

6. For example, the uniform long-arm statute provides:
(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising
from the person's
(1) transacting any business in this state;
(2) contracting to supply services or things in this state;
(3) causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state;
(4) causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this
state if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other
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of presence and power" 7 upon which jurisdiction was once thought
to be based became a vestigal reminder of an earlier era.
Despite this expansion of jurisdiction, not all potential defendants are amenable to the personal jurisdiction of a particular state
court. The post-International Shoe boundaries of jurisdiction were

for 14 years defined by Seider v. Roth.8 In Seider, the New York
Court of Appeals, in a 4-3 decision, held that the contractual obli-

gations of an insurance company were an attachable "debt" under

New York's civil practice statute, 9 thus allowing New York to assert
quasi in rem jurisdiction' over a nonresident defendant (the inpersistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods
used or consumed or services rendered, in this state; [or]
(5) having an interest in, using, or possessing real property, in this state[; or
(6) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this
state at the time of contracting].
(b) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only a
[cause of action] [claim for relief] arising from acts enumerated in this
section may be asserted against him.
UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE AcT § 1.03 (1962 version).
The New York long-arm statute is N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 302 (McKinney 1972).
7. Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 311, 234 N.E.2d 669, 672, 287
N.Y.S.2d 633, 637 (1967).
8. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966), overruled, Rush v.
Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980). Mr. and Mrs. Roth, both residents of New York, were
injured in an automobile accident on a highway in Vermont and they alleged that the
defendant, Lemiux, a resident of Quebec, was negligent. Id. at 112, 216 N.E.2d at
313, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 100. Lemiux was insured by the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, an insurer doing business in New York. The policy was issued in
Canada. The plaintiff, seeking to bring suit in New York, proceeded by attaching
Hartford's contractual obligations to defend and indemnify the defendant. The defendant was personally served in Quebec and attachment papers were served on

Hartford in New York State. Id.
9.

Id.

at 113, 216 N.E.2d at 314, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 101. The relevant sec-

tions of New York law were N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §§ 5201, 6202 (McKinney 1978).
Section 6202 is entitled "Debt or property subject to attachment; proper garnishee"
and provides, in pertinent part: "Any debt or property against which a money judgment may be enforced ...is subject to attachment. The proper garnishee of any such
property or debt is the person designated in section 5201 ..
" Section 5201 describes debt or property subject to enforcement and the proper garnishee for the particular property or debt. Specifically, the provision in controversy, section 5201
stated:
(a) Debt against which a money judgment may be enforced. A money
judgment may be enforced against any debt, which is past due or which is
yet to become due, certainly or upon demand of the judgment debtor,
whether it was incurred within or without the state, to or from a resident or
nonresident, unless it is exempt from application to the satisfaction of the
judgment. A debt may consist of a cause of action which could be assigned
or transferred accruing within or without the state.
N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 5201 (McKinney 1978).
10. The term quasi in rem jurisdiction, as used in this Comment, is the second
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sured). The result of Seider was the provision of a New York forum
for a plaintiff injured outside New York when the defendant's insurer does business in New York. Although the Seider doctrine was
immediately subject to a barrage of criticism from commentators,"

of the two types described by the Supreme Court:
A judgment quasi in rem affects the interests of particular persons in designated property. The latter is of two types. In one the plaintiff is seeking to
secure a pre-existing claim in the subject property and to extinguish or establish the nonexistence of similar interests of particular persons. In the
other the plaintiff seeks to apply what he concedes to be the property of the
defendant to the satisfaction of a claim against him.
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958) (citations omitted). For a detailed
discussion of the development of jurisdictional principles in this country, see Kalo,
Jurisdictionas an Evolutionary Process: The Development of Quasi in Rem and In
Personam Principles, 1978 DuKE L. J. 1147; Silberman, supra note 5, at 40-53; Note,
Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909 (1960).
Historically, early on, attachment of a defendant's property within the forum was
viewed as a means of compelling the defendant to appear before the court, and a
judgment could not be entered unless the defendant appeared. Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction,76 HARv. L. REV. 303, 303-04 (1962); Kalo,
supra, at 1157; Smit, The Enduring Utility of In Rem Rules: A Lasting Legacy of
Pennoyer v. Neff, 43 BROOICLYN L. REV. 600, 616 (1977). As the law of jurisdiction
developed in this country, jurisdiction based on the attachment of the defendant's
property in the state and the availability of that property to satisfy a judgment made
it possible for plaintiffs to bring suit against absconding debtors or tortfeasors. This
development served to mitigate the rigors of securing personal jurisdiction in conformance with Pennoyer v. Neff, which required personal service upon the defendant within the territory of the forum state. Carrington, supra, at 303-05; Lowenfeld,
In Search of the Intangible: A Comment on Shaffer v. Heitner, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv.
102 (1978); Silberman, supra note 5. Thus, the rule in Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215
(1905), discussed at note 23 infra, was viewed as serving a practical function and
may have afforded due process at a time when pursuit of an absconding or out-ofstate debtor was still difficult and expensive. Kalo, supra, at 1190; Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles: Contingent Obligations and the Interstate Corporation, 67
COLUrM. L. REV. 550, 563 (1967).
Personal jurisdiction is preferable to quasi in rem jurisdiction because the
plaintiff's potential recovery is not limited to the value of the property attached.
Some commentators have observed that in light of the expansion of personal jurisdiction since InternationalShoe, a plaintiff was likely to employ quasi in rem jurisdiction only where no other jurisdictional basis existed, and thus force the defendant to
defend in a forum where he ought not be asked to defend. The mode of analysis suggested was the minimum-contacts analysis of InternationalShoe. Carrington, supra,
at 306-09; Hazard, A General Theory of State-CourtJurisdiction, 1965 SuP. CT. REV.
241, 282; Zammit, Quasi-in-Rem Jurisdiction: Outmoded and Unconstitutional?, 49
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 668 (1975). But see Silberman, supra note 5, at 71-72 (suggesting
"double standard" be employed to determine if assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction
comports with minimum contacts standard); Smit, supra at 614 (suggesting that under minimum contacts, quasi in rem jurisdiction is not necessarily congruent with
personal jurisdiction).
11. See, e.g., Reese, The Expanding Scope of Jurisdictionover Non-Residents-
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both the New York Court of Appeals 12 and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit 13 subsequently upheld the Seider
attachment against constitutional challenge. These decisions were
founded upon two different rationales. The state court held that jurisdiction over the named defendant was quasi in rem based on attachment of the insurance company's contractual obligations, pro-

vided that the insurance company did business in the forum state
and was thus properly subject to in personam jurisdiction.' 4 The
circuit court believed that the New York Court of Appeals had created in effect a direct action statute against the insurance company,15 a procedure previously upheld against constitutional challenge in Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp.16

Recently, in Rush v. Savchuk, 17 the Supreme Court held that
jurisdiction based on the attachment of insurance obligations is an
unconstitutional assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction. The Savchuk
opinion was framed very narrowly and the arguments dealing with
the Seider doctrine as in effect a judicially created direct-action
statute were treated summarily. Whether a state can constitutionally enact a direct-action statute was left unanswered by the Court.

In addition, Savchuk failed to address the serious choice-of-law
problems attendant to direct actions.
New York Goes Wild, 1968 INS. COUNSEL J. 118; Comment, supra note 5; Comment,
supra note 10.
12. Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633
(1967), motion for reargument denied, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d
914 (1968); see notes 21-29 supra and accompanying text.
13. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir.), adhered to en bane, 410
F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969); see notes 39-49 infra and
accompanying text. The Simpson court, in fact, expressly disavowed the direct-action
rationale. 21 N.Y.2d at 310-12, 234 N.E.2d at 671-72, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 636-38; see text
accompanying note 16 infra. Not surprisingly, then, the appellants in Minichiello, in
petitioning and receiving a rehearing en banc, argued that the original panel paid insufficient attention to the quasi in rem/minimum-contacts basis of the Simpson decision, an argument the Minichiello court of appeals on rehearing felt warranted substantial discussion. See 410 F.2d at 117-19.
14. 21 N.Y.2d at 311, 234 N.E.2d at 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
15. 410 F.2d at 109-10, adhered to en banc, 410 F.2d 117.
16. 348 U.S. 66 (1954). In a Seider-type action the insured is named as the defendant, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99, while under a direct-action
statute the insurance company is named as the defendant LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
22:655 (West 1977). The Second Circuit relied heavily on the Watson decision in the
context of sustaining the Seider-type attachment on a direct-action rationale. See 410
F.2d at 109-10, adhered to en banc, 410 F.2d at 117 n.1. For a discussion of the validity of the analogy of Watson to Seider, see text accompanying notes 103-122 infra.
17. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
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This Note will begin by examining the twin justifications offered for the Seider attachment: as a valid assertion of quasi in rem
jurisdiction and as a judicially created direct-action statute. It will
then review the affect of the Supreme Court's decision to apply the
concepts of International Shoe to all assertions of jurisdiction, regardless of their purported justification. The following two sections
will examine choice-of-law problems inherent in Seider actions and
the Supreme Court's consideration of a direct-action statute in
Watson. Thus, three issues will have been raised prior to the
discussion here of Rush v. Savchuk: the appropriate jurisdictional
analysis, the existence of choice-of-law problems, and the possibility of legislative action incorporating the Seider procedure. The final two sections will examine the various Savchuk decisions and
the Supreme Court's ultimate response to each of these three
issues.
as a Valid Assertion of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction
Constitutional challenges to the Seider-attachment procedure
were raised for the first time in Simpson v. Loehmann,18 the facts
of which were substantially similar to those of Seider.19 The New
York Court of Appeals summarily dismissed the defendant's separate contentions that the attachment procedure imposed "an undue
burden on interstate commerce in the field of insurance" 20 and violated the Article I, Section 10 prohibition against "impairing the
Obligation of Contracts."21
SEIDER

18. 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967), motion for
reargument denied, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968). An infant plaintiff, a resident of New York, was injured when he was cut by the propeller
of a boat owned by the defendant, a resident of Connecticut. The plaintiff, concededly unable to secure personal jurisdiction over the defendant, attached the defendant's liability policy and had the summons and complaint delivered to the defendant at his residence in Connecticut. Id. at 308, 234 N.E.2d at 670, 287 N.Y.S.2d
at 634.
19. See note 8 supra.
20. 21 N.Y.2d at 308, 234 N.E.2d at 670, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 635. Defendant's argument, founded on the commerce clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, put forth the
proposition that Seider-type attachments unduly hindered the interstate insurance
business. The court, although holding that the defendant lacked standing to raise this
issue, nonetheless went on to say that the Seider-type attachment "'does not constitute an unconstitutional burden on commerce.'" 21 N.Y.2d at 309 n.2, 234 N.E.2d at
670 n.2, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 635 n.2 (citing Davis v. C.C.C. & St. L.R. Co., 217 U.S. 157
(1910) (quoting Morris Plan Ind. Bank v. Gunning, 295 N.Y. 324, 332, 67 N.E.2d 510,
513 (1946)). No elaboration was given concerning the point at which an attachment
procedure would raise such constitutional questions.
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. The defendant's contract-clause argument was
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The court focused instead on the procedural validity of the attachment device. Notwithstanding the novelty of that mechanism,
the court relied on ancient concepts of sovereign power given force
by Pennoyer v. Neff, 22 and extended to tangential associations by

Harris v. Balk. 23 Thus, the Simpson court found it precedentially

consistent to hold that the presence of the insurance obligation in
New York "represent[ed] sufficient of a property right in the defendant to furnish the nexus with and the interest in New York to
premised on the possibility that once jurisdiction was obtained via a Seider-type attachment, the named defendant would refuse to cooperate in the insurer's defense of
the action. The court held simply that this possibility could adequately be dealt with
if the insurer chose to "withdraw and assert ... lack of co-operation in ...any action

brought against" the insurer by the insured. 21 N.Y.2d at 309 n.2, 234 N.E.2d at 670
n.2, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 635 n.2.
22. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
23. 198 U.S. 215 (1905). Harris, a resident of North Carolina, owed Balk $180.
Balk, also a resident of North Carolina, owed Epstein, a resident of Maryland, $344.
While Harris was visiting Baltimore, Epstein caused to be issued a nonresident writ
of attachment against Balk, attaching the debt due Balk from Harris. Harris did not
protest the garnishee process and paid the $180 to Epstein. Upon Harris' return to
North Carolina, Balk commenced an action against Harris to recover the $180. Harris
pleaded that the Maryland judgment and his subsequent payment were conclusive
against Balk because the judgment was a valid judgment in Maryland and entitled to
full faith and credit in the North Carolina courts. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. This contention was not allowed by the trial court and judgment was entered against Harris
and affirmed by the Supreme Court of North Carolina on the ground that the
Maryland court was without jurisdiction because Harris was but temporarily in the
State and the situs of the debt was in North Carolina.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court, after observing that attachment is a
creature of local law, continued:
If there be a law of the State providing for the attachment of the debt, then
if the garnishee be found in that State, and process be personally served
upon him therein, we think the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over him,
and can garnish the debt due from him to the debtor of the plaintiff and condemn it, provided the garnishee could himself be sued by his creditor in
that State.
198 U.S. at 222.
The Court then found that the municipal law of Maryland permitted the garnishment. Id. at 224. Balk had the right to sue Harris in Maryland to recover the debt because, even though he was a citizen of North Carolina, he was entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several States, one of which is the
right to institute actions in the courts of another State. Id. at 223; see U.S. CONST.
art. IV. § 2, cl. 1. In dealing with the issue of the situs of the debt the Court found
that it had no fixed place. Rather, "[the obligation of the debtor to pay his debt
clings to and accompanies him wherever he goes." 198 U.S. at 222-23. That is, Balk's
ability to sue was not dependent on the situs of the debt; what was attached was the
obligation to pay. Id. The jurisdictional justification of the decision was the ageold concept of power. As the Court said, "Power over the person ...confers jurisdic" Id. at 222.
tion on the courts of the State ....

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss1/7

6

Levin: Rush v. Savchuk: Is the Seider Spoiled or Just Getting Harder?

19801

RUSH v. SAVCHUK: IS THE SEIDER SPOILED?

empower its courts to exercise an in rem jurisdiction over him." 24
Having concluded that the Seider-type attachment was consistent with historical notions of state court jurisdictions, the court of
appeals went on to evaluate the practical implications of its theoretical foundation. 25 Tracing the "pragmatic approach" to Interna-

tional Shoe and its progeny, 26 the court observed that "[t]he historical limitations on both in personam and in rem jurisdiction, with
their rigid tests, are giving way to a more realistic and reasonable

evaluation of the respective rights of plaintiffs, defendants and the
State in terms of fairness." 2 7 The court examined the relationship
among the parties and determined that the insurer is really the
party in interest because it controls the litigation, making decisions
concerning appointment of attorneys, potential settlement and procedural tactics. 28 This "realistic" evaluation led the court to conclude that jurisdiction was fair and reasonable in light of Interna-

tional Shoe because:
[W]here the plaintiff is a resident of the forum state and the insurer is present in and regulated by it, the State has a substantial and continuing relation with the controversy. For jurisdictional purposes, in assessing fairness under the due process
24. 21 N.Y.2d at 310, 234 N.E.2d at 671, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 636 (citation omitted).
At the time Simpson arose, New York law did not permit the defendant in an in rem
proceeding to make a limited appearance. The defendant argued that if he came in
to defend, he could be found liable for a judgment in excess of the policy
limits-that is, that the state was using the procedure as a subterfuge in order to obtain the greater potential liability of in personam jurisdiction. The court responded to
this argument by finding that the decision in Seider did not purport to expand the
basis of in personam jurisdiction and that any recovery was limited to the value of
the asset attached-the face amount of the policy. Id., 287 N.Y.S.2d at 636-37. In
denying reargument, the court of appeals further held that the limitation of any recovery to the face amount of the policy applied even if the defendant proceeded
with a defense on the merits. 21 N.Y.2d 990, 991, 238 N.E.2d 319, 320, 290 N.Y.S.2d
914, 916 (1968) (per curiam).
One of the grounds on which the Seider attachment had been criticized was that
there was no way to determine the value of the asset attached because it is a service.
E.g., Comment, supra note 5, at 773. The argument was also made that the obligation
to defend would be exhausted in the course of the proceedings and that under wellestablished garnishment principles, judgments can only be satisfied from assets attached. E.g., Comment, supra note 10, at 566-68. Thus, the effect of holding that the
value of the asset attached was the face amount of the insurance policy was to answer these criticisms.
25. 21 N.Y.2d at 311, 234 N.E.2d at 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
26. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
27. 21 N.Y.2d at 311, 234 N.E.2d at 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
28. Id.
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clause and in determining the public policy of New York, such
29
factors loom large.
What is significant about the Simpson court's secondary analysis is the injection of the plaintiff's residence within the forum as a
factor in the "fairness approach." Although the plaintiffs in both
Simpson and Seider were residents of New York, the Seider court,
in holding the contractual obligations an attachable debt justifying
the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction, articulated the state's interest in terms of its exercise of power over a contractual obligation
owing in New York. 30 Thus, the bare fact that the insurance company was doing business in New York sufficed to answer the question whether the attachment device was a permissible assertion
of jurisdiction. The fact that the Simpson court considered the
plaintiff's residence a factor in determining the constitutionality of
the mechanism at least raises the question whether the court
would have had doubts if the plaintiff were not a forum resident.
The analytical framework emerging from Simpson, then, appeared to require both that the insurer be present and doing business in New York and that the plaintiff be a forum resident. The
first requirement, that the insurer be present, is so easily satisfied
as to be without meaning. In the first place, "it will be a very small
insurance company that does not have a palpable contact with [the]
State." 31 The Second Circuit, for example, found this requirement
met where an insurer was licensed to do business and did "some"
business in New York. 32 In addition, forum-shopping possibilities
29. Id.
30. Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d at 114, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 102.
31. Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d at 316, 234 N.E.2d at 675, 287 N.Y.S.2d at
641 (Breitel, J., concurring).
32. Beja v. Jahangiri, 453 F.2d 959, 962 (2d Cir. 1972). The plaintiff, a New
York resident, was injured in California. The defendants, both of whom were citizens
and residents of California, were insured by Farmers Insurance Group. Jurisdiction
was obtained by attaching the insurance obligations in New York. The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York and were granted a motion to dismiss on the ground that the attachment had
been improperly served on the New York Superintendent of Insurance. Id. at 960. A
new order of attachment was ordered and served on Farmers' agent, Gotsch,
Steinmetz and Winston, insurance brokers in New Rochelle, New York. This attachment was vacated on the ground that Farmers was not doing sufficient business in
New York to sustain the attachment Id.
The issue presented to the court of appeals was the extent to which an insurer
must be "present in" or doing business in New York to give the courts jurisdiction
over the parties consistent with Seider v. Roth. Id. One of the members of the Farm-
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are raised. Early critics of the Seider attachment, reaching to the
insignificance of the first requirement, expressed concern that non-

resident plaintiffs would be attracted to New York because of its
reputation for large verdicts. 3 3

As to the second requirement, some post-Simpson courts held
the Seider-type attachment procedure violative of due process
where the plaintiff was not a New York resident. 34 The New York
ers' group had been licensed to do business in New York as a foreign reciprocal insurer since 1951; another member of the group had been similarly licensed since
1954. It was admitted that those companies were the defendant-insurers. Id.
The firm of Gotsch, Steinmetz and Winston had been Farmers' New York agent
since 1951. In 1969, the only year for which figures were given, Farmers issued approximately $15,000 worth of workmen's compensation, $100 worth of automobile
personal injury, and $60 worth of property damage insurance in New York. Id. The
court held that jurisdiction was obtained over the defendants by virtue of the attachment. In reaching its conclusion the court found that "[t]here is no constitutional impediment to jurisdiction in the present case; the fact that Farmers has been continually licensed in New York for twenty years, has an agent and office there, and
regularly does some business in the state is enough to meet the fairness test." Id.
at 962.
33. 21 N.Y.2d at 316, 234 N.E.2d at 675, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 641 (Breitel, J., concurring). The Seider attachment was also criticized on a variety of grounds which did
not raise constitutional issues. For example, the argument was made that the insurer's obligation to defend and indemnify does not arise until a suit is otherwise validly commenced. That is to say, the court could not logically justify its assertion of
jurisdiction on an obligation that had yet to mature. See 17 N.Y.2d at 115-17, 216
N.E.2d at 315-17, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 103-05 (Burke, J., dissenting). See also Comment,
supra note 10, at 555.
Another area of objection concerned the "intangible" nature of the obligations
and the problem of assigning them a situs. Where the obligation is present in several
states and there are multiple plaintiffs, the insurance company may be subject to
claims in excess of the policy limits due to the multiplicity of litigation. See, e.g.,
Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d at 119 (en banc).
It becomes difficult to catalogue the criticisms of and problems with the Seider
attachment. Professor David Siegel observed that "'[w]hatever problems one can
conjure up in connection with [Seider] prove incomplete; more appear, and each
partakes of the same theoretical and practical difficulties. These problems often
prove so bizarre that they become difficult to even verbalize.'" N.Y. CIV. PRAc. LAW
§ 5201, commentary at 16 (McKinney Supp. 1967), quoted in Simpson v. Loehmann,
21 N.Y.2d at 317, 234 N.E.2d at 675, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 642 (1967) (Burke, J., dissenting).
34. See, e.g., Vaage v. Lewis, 29 A.D.2d 315, 288 N.Y.S.2d 521 (2d Dep't 1968)
where the court observed that where the plaintiff is a nonresident, the solitary nexus
for the New York courts is the fact that the defendant's foreign insurer is authorized
to do business in New York. Although the court invoked the doctrine of forum non
conveniens to avoid an influx of unnecessary and unwanted lawsuits, the court also
believed that an exercise of jurisdiction would deprive the defendants of due process. Id. at 318, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 524-25. See also Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc.,
411 F.2d 812, 816 (2d Cir. 1969). There the court found that
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Court of Appeals was faced with this issue in Donawitz v. Danek.3 5

The debate there between Judge Wachtler writing for the major36
ity

and Judge Jasen concurring separately

7

raised serious ques-

tions concerning not only the Seider attachment and the related issue of nonresident plaintiffi, but also the appropriate analytical
framework within which questions of quasi in rem jurisdiction

should be considered.
The short majority opinion was largely a defense of its decision

to adhere to the principles of stare decisis. 38 The majority, however, while reaffirming Seider, declined to "expand the scope of

the doctrine" 39 to nonresident plaintiffs. In a one-sentence justification, the court wrote that,
[w]hile the insurer's 'duty to defend and indemnify' has been

found to be an attachable debt where the plaintiff is a resident,
this special type of contract duty, however it may be classified or

[Wihere there are absolutely no New York contacts except for the doing of
business by the insurers, we have the gravest difficulty in understanding
how New York could constitutionally call upon the insureds to respond or
could impair by attachment rights the insurers would otherwise have to settle with other claimants.
Id. at 816 (footnote omitted). Later it was determined that the plaintiff's residence
was to be determined as of the time of the accident and not the time of commencement of suit. Fish v. Bamby Bakers, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 511 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
35. 42 N.Y.2d 138, 366 N.E.2d 253, 397 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1977).
36. Id. at 140-43, 366 N.E. 2d at 254-56, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 593-95.
37. Id. at 143-51, 366 N.E.2d at 256-61, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 595-601 (Jasen, J., concurring).
38. The majority opinion, which runs three pages in the New York Reports,
consists of a one-and-one-half page statement of the case, a one-page defense of
Seider vis-a-vis the principle of stare decisis, and a one-paragraph "discussion" of
the question raised by the existence of a nonresident plaintiff seeking utilization of
the Seider-type attachment. Id. at 140-43, 366 N.E.2d at 254-56, 397 N.Y.S.2d at
593-95. As to its reliance on the principle of stare decisis, the majority wrote:
We are not unmindful of the continued criticism of our holdings in
Seider v. Roth and Simpson v. Loehmann. Although several members of the
court may believe in the legitimacy of some of this criticism, the majority
cannot fail to take into account considerations of institutional stability and
the mandates of stare decisis. A court should not depart from its prior holdings "unless impelled by 'the most cogent reasons.'
As recently as July of last year, this court unanimously reaffirmed the
Seider-Simpson doctrine, and it would be scandalous for us to abandon it at
this time ....
Id. at 14142, 366 N.E.2d at 255, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 594-95 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Baker v. Lorillard, 4 N.Y. 257, 261 (1850)). Stare decisis was
also a major influence on the court of appeals' decision in Neuman v. Dunham, 39
N.Y.2d 999, 355 N.E.2d 294, 387 N.Y.S.2d 240 (1976).
39. 42 N.Y.2d at 142, 366 N.E.2d at 256, 397 N.Y.S. at 595.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss1/7

10

Levin: Rush v. Savchuk: Is the Seider Spoiled or Just Getting Harder?

1980]

RUSH v. SAVCHUK: IS THE SEIDER SPOILED?

denominated, is not of sufficient substance to support
quasi in
40
rem jurisdiction where the plaintiff is a nonresident.
The significance of the court's statement is its characterization of
the substance of the attachable debt not in terms of the debt itself,
but instead in terms of the plaintiff's residence. 4 1 While this approach appears facially untenable, a more probing question must
be asked before that conclusion can be reached. That is, "What is
the basis of state court jurisdiction"? If the Pennoyer v. Neff4 2 -- Harris v. Balk4 3 concept of sovereign power provides the basis, the
state's power in rem over the debt in question should be unaffected by the residence of the plaintiff. If, on the other hand, the
minimum contacts-fairness approach initiated by International
Shoe 44 provides the relevant basis, the residence of the plaintiff
may be a factor to be considered in determining the propriety of
the jurisdiction claimed.
45
Since Seider was the determinant precedent in Donawitz,
and because Seider unquestionably relied upon Pennoyer-type notions of a state's in rem power, 46 the Donawitz majority's inclusion
of plaintiff's residence in the decisional calculus is a clear break
with precedent. Still, it can be argued that the result was correct
47
in spite of faulty reasoning, a conclusion reached by Judge Jasen.
Further, if Seider and its progeny relied on the Pennoyer-power
foundation, the validity of the Seider-type attachment warranted
re-examination in light of the long-standing concepts of International Shoe. These questions were to be addressed in 1980, two

40. Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
41. As Judge Jasen noted in his concurring opinion, "the substance of an attachable debt is in [no] way affected, much less diminished, by the nonresidence of
the attaching party." Id. at 143, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 596 (Jasen, J., concurring). Judge
Jasen also believed that the distinction between residents and nonresidents raised
equal protection problems. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. As Judge Jasen wrote,
[A]n asset of a nonresident defendant is made no less substantial by the fact
that the plaintiff who would seize the asset is not from New York. Indeed, to
deny a nonresident plaintiff the right to attach the same debt upon which a
resident plaintiff could sue in itself poses grave questions of fundamental
fairness and constitutionality.
42 N.Y.2d at 143, 366 N.E.2d at 256, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 596 (Jasen, J., concurring).
42. 95 U.S. 714 (1877); see text accompanying notes 22-24 supra.
43. 198 U.S. 215 (1905); see note 23 supra.
44. 326 U.S. 310 (1945); see notes 2-3 supra.
45. See 42 N.Y.2d at 140-43, 366 N.E.2d at 254-56, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 593-95.
46. See 17 N.Y.2d at 112-14, 216 N.E.2d at 313-15, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 100-02.
47. See 42 N.Y.2d at 143-51, 366 N.E.2d at 256-61, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 595-601.
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years after the Donawitz decision,4 8 by the Supreme Court in Rush

v. Savchuk, 49 and will be elaborated upon later in this Note.50
as a Judicially Created DirectAction Statute
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was
faced with the Seider-attachment question in Minichiello v.
SEIDER

Rosenberg.51 Judge Friendly, writing for the majority, character-

ized Seider as "in effect a judicially created direct action statute,"5 2

based on his reading of the New York Court of Appeals' Simpson
opinion. Relying on Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance
Corp.,5 3 Judge Friendly believed that the Supreme Court would
sustain the validity of direct-action statute in favor of residents as

well as on behalf of persons injured within the state, but doubted
whether the Court would sanction such a direct-action statute
where the forum was neither the place of injury nor the plaintiff's

residence.

54

The most interesting aspect of the initial Minichiello opinion is

its defense of the direct-action rationale in International Shoe
terms. The factors given primary consideration, i.e., the state's in48. For a discussion of judicial inefficiency attributable to a lack of guidance by
the Supreme Court, see Lusky, Public Trial and Public Right: The Missing Bottom
Line, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 273, 318-23 (1980).
49. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
50. See text accompanying notes 141-162, 198-211 infra.
51. 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir.), adhered to en banc, 410 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969).
52. Id. at 109. Judge Friendly arrived at this conclusion despite the fact that
both the Seider and Simpson courts denied that the attachment was the equivalent of

direct action:
It is said that by affirmance here we would be setting up a "direct action" against the insurer. That is true to the extent only that affirmance will
put jurisdiction in New York State and require the insurer to defend here,
not because a debt owing by it to the defendant has been attached but because by its policy it has agreed to defend in any place where jurisdiction is
obtained against its insured.
Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d at 114, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 102, quoted in
Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d at 311, 234 N.E.2d at 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 637.

53. 348 U.S. 66 (1954); see notes 103-117 infra and accompanying text.
54. 410 F.2d at 110. The court also considered the Supreme Court's dismissal
of an appeal in Victor v. Lyon Assocs., 21 N.Y.2d 695, 234 N.E.2d 459, 287 N.Y.S.2d
424 (1967), appeal dismissed for want of a substantialfederal question sub nom.
Hanover Ins. Co. v. Victor, 393 U.S. 7 (1968). The Minichiello court was not the only
court to rely on the Supreme Court's dismissal of Victor, a companion case to
Simpson; the dismissal was cited as recently as Savchuk v. Rush, 272 N.W.2d 888,
891 n.4 (Minn. 1978). While the Supreme Court itself did not cite Victor in its final
opinion in Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980), it would appear that Victor is overruled by that opinion.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss1/7

12

Levin: Rush v. Savchuk: Is the Seider Spoiled or Just Getting Harder?

19801

RUSH v. SAVCHUK: IS THE SEIDER SPOILED?

terest in protecting and providing care for its citizens 55 and the
" movement away from the bias favoring the defendant,' in matters
of personal jurisdiction 'toward permitting the plaintiff to insist that
the defendant come to him' where there is a sufficient basis for
doing so,"'56 fall within the ambit of a minimum contacts-fairness

analysis. Yet, as noted above, 57 Seider and its progeny, at least in
the state courts of New York, rested on the state-power concepts of
the Pennoyer line of cases. It was thus, in the Second Circuit's en

banc rehearing of Minichiello, that the court found merit in petitioner's contention "that the previous majority opinion was overly
preoccupied with a conception of Seider v. Roth as 'in effect a judicially created direct action statute,' "58 that is, as a constitutional
fairness issue, rather than a constitutional power question.
The en banc majority opinion began 59 by properly noting that
Harris v. Balk was the foundation of the Seider rule. Once this
recognition was stated, however, the opinion compared the fairness
of requiring Balk to defend in Maryland 60 vis-a-vis the fairness of requiring the defendant-insured to participate at trial in New York.61
55. 410 F.2d at 109-10.
56. Id. at 110.
57. See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra.
58. 410 F.2d at 117.
59. Id. at 118.
60. See note 23 supra.
61. The court determined that the defendant's problem was less serious than
Balk's because unlike Balk he was deprived not of any personal property but only
the proceeds of the policy which was purchased to protect against losses to others.

410 F.2d at 118. The defendant was found to have an additional protection because,
by definition, Seider attachments always involve diversity and may be removed from
the state court to a federal court where they may be transferred to a more convenient
forum. Id. at 119.
Cases which are brought in a state court may be removed to the federal district
court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976). 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976) provides that "[flor
the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court
may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have
been brought." The court refused to transfer in the companion case to Minichiello,
Stevens v. Tyng, because the trial judge there "found that the preponderant issue
was the extent of plaintiff's injury." 410 F.2d at 119. The Second Circuit found that
decision to "sufficiently [indicate] that the places of accident or of defendant's residence are not always the most convenient fora." Id. (citation omitted).
The court also dealt with the assertion that the defendant would suffer unfairly if
a judgment against him were given collateral estoppel effect in a second action by
summarily finding that "we cannot fairly hold that New York has denied due process
merely because of the possibility that some other state may do so." Id. at 112. In
fact, the court foresaw that that application of the Seider attachment could produce
several due process problems; it expressed particular concern in the area of counterclaims but found that New York had no compulsory counterclaim rule and concluded
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This analysis, as recognized by the en banc dissenters, 62 was inapposite to the Harris foundation, for Harris rested on state power
over the attachable debt, and not on the "fairness" consequences
of such an exercise of jurisdiction. As the dissenters explained it,
"[t]he rule of Harris,which in effect sanctions the mere presence of
the garnishee as a sufficient jurisdictional base, [was not and] 'cannot be justified in terms of fairness.' "63
Following Minichiello, Simpson, and Donawitz, the status of
the Seider attachment in New York federal and state courts was left
in an interesting confusion. The New York Court of Appeals correctly interpreted Harris v. Balk in upholding Seider attachments
but failed to recognize that since International Shoe the purepower concepts of Harris were of questionable precedential value.
The Second Circuit, on the other hand, upheld Seider attachments
(correctly or otherwise) in terms of contemporary concepts of fairness, but incorrectly attributed this rationale to Harris v. Balk.
Thus, both courts failed to account for the magnitude of the change
in jurisdictional principles initiated by International Shoe, and
were led, albeit in different ways, to a mistaken reliance on Harris
v. Balk. Regardless of the variety of muddled reasoning, Seiderattachment procedures were found to be constitutional-at least as
long as Harrisv. Balk stood.
Extending International Shoe
64
The Supreme Court's 1977 decision in Shaffer v. Heitner
came to grips with the wisdom of applying the minimum contactsSHAFFER V. HEITNER:

that the insured was in no position to assert one under a direct-action statute. Id. at
112-13.
62. 410 F.2d at 120-22 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 122 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (quoting Note, supra note 10, at 960).
64. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). Heitner, who owned one share of stock in Greyhound
Corporation, initiated a shareholders' derivative suit in Delaware chancery court
against Greyhound Corporation, Greyhound Lines, Incorporated (a wholly owned

subsidiary of Greyhound Corporation), and twenty-eight present or former officers or
directors of both corporations. Greyhound was incorporated in Delaware with its

principal place of business in Arizona. The individual defendants were all nonresidents of Delaware. Id. at 189. Jurisdiction over 21 of the defendants was obtained
under the Delaware sequestration statute which permitted seizure of property-here
primarily stock in Greyhound-located within the state. Although as far as the record
showed, none of the certificates representing the stock were physically present, an-

other Delaware statute made Delaware the situs of ownership of all stock in Delaware corporations. Id. at 191-92; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 169, which provides:
For all purposes of title, action, attachment, garnishment, and jurisdic-
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fairness analysis of International Shoe, previously made explicitly
applicable to assertions of only in personam jurisdiction, 6 5 to assertions as well of in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction. As Justice
Marshall stated the issue for the Court, "quasi in rem jurisdiction
is traditionally based on attachment or seizure of property present
in the jurisdiction, not on contacts between the defendant and the
State .... This categorical analysis assumes the continued soundness of the conceptual structure founded on the century-old case of
Pennoyer v. Neff."66
Pennoyer, based on a sensitivity to the nineteenth-century
pre-industrial concept that "[t]he authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is
established," 67 had become an anachronism with the achievement
of a highly mobile, heavily interdependent society. As Justice
Marshall noted, the development of national corporations and the
automobile forced the courts to develop fictional concepts of
consent in order to stay within the Pennoyer rule. 68 In practice,
however, the theoretical fictions were actually attempts to develop
a theory based on fairness, rather than on antiquated notions of
power or consent to power. 69 This progression led to the International Shoe decision, which defined fairness in terms of contacts,
and produced something of a revolution regarding in personam jurisdiction. Yet, some 32 years after the revolution, there was a difference of opinion as to the applicability of International Shoe to
70
assertions of in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction.
The determinative fact 71 in Shaffer was that the property sequestered was entirely unrelated to the cause of action. 72 The detion of all courts held in this State, but not for the purpose of taxation, the situs of the ownership of the capital stock of all corporations existing under
the laws of this State, whether organized under this chapter or otherwise,
shall be regarded as in this State.
65. See 433 U.S. at 204-05. But cf. cases cited id. at 205 (lower courts questioning nonapplication of minimum-contacts standard to in rem cases).
66. Id. at 196 (citation omitted).
67. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 720.
68. 433 U.S. at 201-03.
69. See id. at 203.
70. See id. at 205. Thus, the Court believed "that the time is ripe to consider
whether the standard of fairness and substantial justice set forth in International
Shoe should be held to govern actions in rem as well as in personam." Id. at 206.
71. See O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194, 199 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1034 (1978).
72. 433 U.S. at 213.
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fendants had objected to the Delaware courts' assertion of jurisdiction, claiming that their contacts with the state were insufficient to
sustain jurisdiction in conformance with International Shoe. 73 In

order to approve of the defendants' theory, the Court first needed
to cross the theoretical bridge spanning in personam and in
rem/quasi in rem assertions of jurisdiction. The Court successfully
made the crossing, reasoning that,
'IIt]he phrase, "judicial jurisdiction over a thing," is a customary
elliptical way of referring to jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing.' This recognition leads to the conclusion that in
order to justify an exercise of jurisdiction in rem, the basis for
jurisdiction must be sufficient to justify exercising 'jurisdiction
over the interests of persons in a thing.' The standard for
determining whether an exercise of jurisdiction over the interests of persons is consistent with the Due Process Clause is the
minimum-contacts standard elucidated in International Shoe. 74
Given this reasoning, cases where "the only role played by the
property is to provide the basis for bringing the defendant into
court," 7 5 could not satisfy due process standards. 76 The type of
quasi in rem action typified by Harris v. Balk and Shaffer clearly
fell into this category; Harris was overruled 7 7 and Shaffer reversed. 78 Hence, the constitutionality of the Seider attachment7 9
73. Id. at 193.
74. Id. at 207 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(Second) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 56, Introductory Note (1971)).
75. Id. at 209 (footnote omitted).
76. The Court was careful to state that it was not entirely eliminating the concept of in rem jurisdiction and noted that the presence of the defendants' property in
a state might suggest other ties among the defendant, the state, and the litigation. Id.
at 207-08. The Court found, for example, that where claims to the in-state property itself are the source of the underlying controversy or where the suit was for injury suffered on the land of an absentee owner, the minimum-contacts standard of International Shoe would probably be satisfied. Id. at 208.
77. See id. at 209.
78. Id. at 217.
79. It is worth noting here that the Court also wrote that "if a direct assertion of
personal jurisdiction over the defendant would violate the Constitution, it would
seem that an indirect assertion ...should be equally impermissible." Id. at 209.
When it is clear who the real party in interest is this standard is easy enough to apply. However, when the defendant is not that party, the terms "direct" and "indirect" have less meaning. As Justice Stevens noted, dissenting in Rush v. Savchuk,
444 U.S. 320, 333-34 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting), one function of quasi in rem jurisdiction is to reach the real party in interest where the property serving as the purported basis for jurisdiction over the named defendant is actually controlled by that
"real" party. Id. Thus, Justice Stevens' separate opinion in Shaffer, in which he ex-
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263

was immediately called into question.8 0

Seider Reconsidered
The Seider doctrine was quickly challenged. Although lower

courts were divided on whether the assertion of jurisdiction com-

ported with due process, 8 ' both the Court of Appeals for the Sec-

ond Circuit8 2 and the New York Court of Appeals8 3 found that
Seider remained viable after Shaffer. While both courts were
mindful of Shaffer, the Second Circuit's opinion in O'Connor v.
Lee-Hy Paving Corp.8 4 more closely scrutinized the instant facts
vis-a-vis the Supreme Court's analysis. Judge Friendly, writing for

the court as he did in Minichiello,s5 began by noting that Shaffer
demanded that the property attached not serve as the sole basis for

jurisdiction, particularly where it is unrelated to the cause of acpressed a fear that the Court ignored "long-accepted methods of acquiring jurisdiction over persons with adequate notice of both the particular controversy and the fact
that their local activities might subject them to suit," 433 U.S. at 219 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment), may have defined an area between the egregious sequestration procedure at issue in Shaffer, and the clearly appropriate in rem procedure used where the claim arises "for injury suffered on the land of an absentee
owner." Id. at 208. On the basis of Justice Stevens' dissent in Rush v. Savchuk, 444
U.S. at 333-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting), one might well conclude that the Shaffer
opinion did indeed "decide a great deal more than [was] necessary," 433 U.S. at 219
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment), to invalidate Delaware's use of the sequestration procedure.
80. Rush v. Savchuk was on the Supreme Court docket at the same time as
Shaffer and was remanded to the Minnesota Supreme Court for reconsideration in
light of Shaffer three days after the Shaffer decision. 433 U.S. 902 (1977). A new barrage of commentary on the viability of Seider after Shaffer quickly appeared. See,
e.g., Dachs, Sipping Seider Through a Straw, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 533 (1979);
Dooling, Seider v. Roth after Shaffer v. Heitner, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 505 (1979);
Note, The Constitutionality of Seider v. Roth After Shaffer v. Heitner, 78 COLUmx. L.
REV. 409 (1978) [hereinafter cited as COLUMBIA Note]; Note, Shaffer v. Heitner: New
Constitutional Questions Concerning Seider v. Roth, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 393 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as HOFSTRA Note].

81. See, e.g., Torres v. Towmotor Div. of Caterpillar, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 460
(E.D.N.Y. 1977) (no minimum contacts); Alford v. McGaw, 61 A.D.2d 504, 402
N.Y.S.2d 499 (4th Dep't 1978) (property related to cause of action); Wallace v. Target
Stores, Inc., 92 Misc. 2d 454, 400 N.Y.S.2d 478 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1977) (insurance policy not related to cause of action); Katz v. Umansky, 92 Misc. 2d 285, 399
N.Y.S.2d 412 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1977) (Seider attachment fails to meet minimum
contacts); Kennedy v. Deroker, 91 Misc. 2d 648, 398 N.Y.S.2d 628 (Sup. Ct. Fulton
County 1977) (no minimum contacts).
82. O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1034 (1978).
83. Baden v. Staples, 45 N.Y.2d 889, 383 N.E.2d 110, 410 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1978)
(per curiam).
84. 579 F.2d 194.
85. 410 F.2d 106, adhered to en bane, 410 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1968).
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tion. 8 6 He then provided a three-part analysis of the jurisdictional
question.
The first part of Judge Friendly's analysis examined the nature
of the debt attached. Insofar as the relation of that debt to the substantive claim was concerned, the court had little trouble distinguishing Shaffer. The sole purpose of the obligation to defend (the
"debt" attached) was "to protect against the type of liability which
is the subject of the lawsuit .... "87 Thus, a clear relationship existed between substance and procedure. Further, the insured

could suffer no substantial deprivation. Unlike in Harris v. Balk,
where Balk stood to lose $180 and/or attorney's fees, 8 the effect of
"a Seider judgment would mean simply that liability policies, on
which [insured parties] could not have realized for any purpose
other than to protect themselves against losses to others, will be
applied to the very objective for which they were procured.' ' 9
That is, whatever the defendant stood to lose was directly related
to the potential judgment against him.
The second portion of the O'Connor opinion was an attempt to
satisfy the need, attributed to Shaffer,90 for a realistic approachan approach which would evaluate the actual interests at stake in
the litigation. On this point, the Second Circuit, in interpreting
New York law, believed that the second portion of the opinion in
Simpson v. Loehmann9 1 predicted Shaffer. Thus, the court simply
repeated the well-known arguments that the insurer in all aspects
controls the litigation 92 and, since New York could properly assert
in personam jurisdiction over the insurer without undue hardship
arising, 9 3 the insurer "has no justifiable ground for complaint at

86. 579 F.2d at 198-99.
87. Id. at 199.
88. Id.
89. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d at 118).
90. Id. at 200.
91. 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967); see text accompanying notes 25-29 supra.
92. 579 F.2d at 200; see text accompanying notes 27-29 supra.
93. 579 F.2d at 200-01. Here the sufficient basis is furnished by the insurer's
maintaining an office and regularly transacting business in New York-not to speak
of the convenience to the plaintiff in having a trial where witnesses on damages will
be more readily available and the fact that in the large proportion of these actions
that are settled the insurer usually has no particular interest in requiring the action
to be brought at the site of the accident or the residence of the insured. Id. at 201.
The court noted that the insurer might be prejudiced by fear of the greater liberality
of New York juries in awarding damages, but concluded that this interest was not su-
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New York's asserting a jurisdiction over the insured.. .."94
It was this argument, however, which took the court out of
the Shaffer approach, for Shaffer never suggested that a real-partyin-interest analysis was the type of "realistic evaluation" it
sought. 9 5 What Shaffer did require was an analysis of the named
defendant's interest in the attachable property as it related to the
litigation. 96 The Second Circuit, however, sidestepped this command, instead arguing that,
Seider v. Roth and Simpson are sui generis in the field of
jurisdiction. They cannot be pigeon-holed as in rem or in
personam. They are in real terms in personam so far as the insurer is concerned. For the named defendant the suit is only an
occasion of cooperation in the defense; his active role is that of
witness. It is beside the point to test the constitutionality of the
procedure in terms of the named defendant; his role as a party is
hardly more real than that of the casual ejector Richard Roe in
common law ejectment actions. What is at stake in the suit is
plaintiff's claim for the payment of his alleged damages by the
insurer. 97
Whether or not it was "beside the point" to examine the procedure
purely in terms of the named defendant would await consideration
98
by the Supreme Court.
If the Second Circuit was somewhat disingenuous in its attempt to explain away Shaffer, it at least sought a new framework
for decision. The New York Court of Appeals, on the other hand,

perior to that of a New York resident in having damages assessed by a jury of his
state of residence. Id. at 201 n.10.
94. Id. at 200.
95. Cf. note 79 supra (explaining weakness of Shaffer Courts reluctance to allow indirect methods of reaching real-party defendants).
96. See 433 U.S. at 207.
97. 579 F.2d at 200 (emphasis added) (quoting O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving
Corp., 437 F. Supp. 994, 1002 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)).
98. As mentioned in text, see text accompanying note 86 supra, Judge Friendly's
analysis was three-pronged. The third prong evaluated the hardships imposed on the
insured by the New York assertion of jurisdiction, even though the court recognized
that it was somewhat anomalous to consider the insurer the real party in interest and
nonetheless place significant emphasis on the insured. 579 F.2d at 201. The court
proceeded to review issues of collateral estoppel, see note 61 supra, and the ability
of the insured to appear in New York, 579 F.2d at 202, and concluded that, at least
on the facts of O'Connor, the Seider attachment procedure met the due process requirements of InternationalShoe and Shaffer. See id. Other issues given brief consideration in O'Connor are reviewed at note 61 supra.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1980

19

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 7
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9: 247

seemed weary of the issue it had first raised in Seider,99 and made
little effort to offer new justification for its past opinions.

The court, in a per curiam memorandum, stated first that
even if Seider relied on Harrisv. Balk, Simpson foresaw the coming
of Shaffer and predicted the appropriate analysis. 10 0 With no fur-

ther justification, the court concluded that "[t]he Seider rule therefore satisfies the jurisdictional standards set forth in the Shaffer

case."' 10 1 The remainder of the memorandum was a one-and-one-

half page restatement of the court's reliance on stare decisis,' 0 2 a

reliance, however well-placed, that failed to account for the need
to address in depth the Supreme Court's lengthy opinion in

Shaffer.
Choice-of-Law Considerations

The Seider rule has been criticized, not only as an erroneous
jurisdictional doctrine, but also because it presented an opportunity for forum shopping-shopping for the possibility of obtaining

higher damages from traditionally generous New York juries' 0 3 and
shopping for the potential of more favorable law.' 0 4 In Tjepkema v.
99. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). The court's "weariness" is evident from the first paragraph of its per curiam opinion:
The issue is whether Seider v. Roth should be overruled. The issue is not
new for the court; it has been raised with frequency in the 12 years since
the Seider case was first decided. Considerations of stare decisis and institutional stability, absent compelling grounds to the contrary, require that this
challenge, like the others, be rejected.
Baden v. Staples, 45 N.Y.2d 889, 890, 383 N.E.2d 110, 110, 410 N.Y.S.2d 808, 808
(1978) (per curiam) (mem.).
100. 45 N.Y.2d at 891, 383 N.E.2d at 111, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 809.
101. Id. The only jurisdictional analysis in the memorandum, in fact, is a brief
summary of the Second Circuit's rationale in O'Connor,see text accompanying notes
86-98 supra, and a New York intermediate court's opinion in Alford v. McGaw, 61
A.D.2d 504, 402 N.Y.S.2d 499 (4th Dep't), appeal dismissed, 45 N.Y.2d 776 (1978).
102. 45 N.Y.2d at 892-93, 383 N.E.2d at 111-12, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 809-10. The
gist of the court's reliance on stare decisis was the following:

[The Seider rule] provoked sharp disagreement at its inception; it is still the
subject of controversy. The balance of those is support and in opposition to
the rule may have shifted, as it may shift again. Yet if such shifts are reflected in decisional law, stability is lost, and to no commensurate gain. The
practical effect of the rule is so insignificant that, in this instance, there is
validity in the aphorism, always to be charily applied, that it is more important that the law be settled than that it be settled "correctly."
Id. at 892, 383 N.E.2d at 111, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 810.
103. E.g., Comment, supra note 10, at 565.
104. E.g., Chase, Quasi in Rem Jurisdictionin Social Context: Some Thoughts
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Kenney,' 0 5 for example, New York refused to apply another state's
wrongful death limitation where jurisdiction was obtained via the
Seider attachment. Although the accident occurred in Missouri and
the defendant was a resident of that state, the court held that the
Missouri wrongful death limitation should not be applied because
the decedent was a New York resident, the estate was being administered in New York, and the plaintiff-widow and her children
who were distributees were New York residents. 0 6 Thus, the same
interests cited by New York as providing a basis for jurisdiction
also served as the basis for application of forum law.
The coincidence of rationale for asserting jurisdiction and applying forum law most certainly presents a question, at least on a
case-by-case basis, concerning the wisdom of the Seider-attachment
device. The coincidence, however, may be no more than that, as
the choice-of-law jurisprudence had a development all its own,
even though in theory it parallels the development of jurisdictional
principles from Pennoyer to International Shoe. 10 7 Judge Fuld of
the New York Court of Appeals summarized the choice-of-law development in Babcock v. Jackson,'0 8 a landmark case' 0 9 in the confficts field:
The traditional choice of law rule, embodied in the original
Restatement of Conflict of Laws (§ 384), and until recently unquestionably followed in this court, has been that the substantive
rights and liabilities arising out of a tortious occurrence are determinable by the law of the place of the tort. It had its conceptual foundation in the vested rights doctrine, namely, that a
right to recover for a foreign tort owes its creation to the law of
the jurisdiction where the injury occurred and depends for its
existence and extent solely on such law. Although espoused by
such great figures as Justice HOLMES and Professor Beale, the
vested rights doctrine has long since been discredited because it
fails to take account of underlying policy considerations in

on a New Statute, 45 BROOKLYN L. REv. 617, 629-30 (1979); Comment, Quasi in
Rem Jurisdiction Based on Insurer's Obligations, 19 STAN. L. REv. 654, 660 (1967).
105. 31 A.D.2d 908, 298 N.Y.S.2d 175 (1st Dep't 1968).
106. Id.
107. See Preface to R. CRAMPTON, D. CURRIE, & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS
at xiii (2d ed. 1975).
108. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
109. See Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438, 441 (2d Cir. 1973); R. CRAMPTON,
D. CURRIE, & H. KAY, supra note 107, at 24344.
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evaluating the significance to be ascribed to the circumstance
that an act had a foreign situs in determining the rights and liabilities which arise out of that act ..... .More particularly, as
applied to torts, the theory ignores the interest which jurisdictions other than that where the tort occurred may have in the
resolution of particular issues."10
Thus, the choice-of-law jurisprudence moved from a place-ofinjury analysis analogous to Pennoyer-power concepts to a state
interest-"grouping of contacts" ' analysis analogous to the minimum contacts-fairness analysis of International Shoe. And just as
the post-Shaffer cases were criticized for incorrectly applying the
minimum-contacts test,11 2 the interest analysis courts were criticized"13 for misreading choice-of-law issues in the Seider content.
The facts of Rosenthal v. Warren"14 illustrate the choice-of-law
issues involved. Dr. Rosenthal, a resident of New York, travelled
to Boston, where he was examined and diagnosed by Dr. Warren.
He died in a Boston hospital while under Dr. Warren's care eight
days after surgery was performed by Dr. Warren. Rosenthal's survivors brought a wrongful death suit in New York state court,
alleging malpractice and asking $1,250,000 damages. Jurisdiction
over Dr. Warren was obtained through use of the Seider attachment." i5 The defendants removed to federal court on the basis of
diversity of citizenship. The Massachusetts wrongful death statute
limited recoverable damages to a maximum of $50,000 and prescribed that damages be dependent on the tortfeasor's degree of
culpability."16 New York, however, had a strong policy against any
such limitation, enshrined in a constitutional prohibition against
them." i 7 On the surface, then, there appeared to be a true conflict

110. 12 N.Y.2d at 477-78, 191 N.E.2d at 281, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 746 (citations
omitted) (footnote omitted).
111. Id. at 479. Whether the Babcock case set up a contacts analysis or interest
analysis is subject to some dispute if based solely on a reading of the Babcock text.
However, as the Second Circuit observed, the New York Court of Appeals relied almost entirely on the interest-analysis interpretation of Babcock subsequent to that
case. See Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d at 442-43.
112. See text accompanying notes 81-101 supra.

113.

See Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L.

REV. 185, 227 (1976); Silberman, supra note 5, at 99.

114. 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973).
115. Id. at 439-40.
116.

Id. at 439.

117. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 16; see 475 F.2d at 441.
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between New York's interest and Massachusetts' interest in having
its own law applied.
In arguing that Massachusetts' interest was superior, the defendants introduced an affidavit of the head of the casualty underwriting division of the insurer's Boston office indicating that a general surgeon's liability policy in Massachusetts had a basic limit
premium of $192, while a New York City surgeon paid $1,139, and
that "one factor contributing to the difference is the 'dollar exposure' in New York, which has no wrongful death limitation. "118
Massachusetts' wrongful-death limitation, however, applied to all
such actions, and not just to those involving claims of medical malpractice. 119 Thus, the state's interest was a general one "in limiting
damages for wrongful deaths allegedly caused by Massachusetts citizens or occurring in Massachusetts." 120
New York, on the other hand, was a pioneer state in blocking
wrongful-death limitations; 121 further, after New York began
refusing to apply contrary wrongful-death rules in choice-of-law
cases, other states moved toward the New York position.' 22 Thus,
the Second Circuit, charged with divining the result the New York
Court of Appeals would reach, had little reason to believe New
York would come to a conclusion contrary to a trend it had initiated. 123 The court concluded that the New York Court of Appeals
would view the Massachusetts limitation as "so 'absurd and unjust'
that the New York policy of fully compensating the harm from
118. 475 F.2d at 440 (quoting affidavit of defendant).
119. Id. at 444-45.
120. Id. at 444. Two concepts may have been behind the Massachusetts law.
First, the state may have feared the bringing of excessive or fraudulent wrongfuldeath claims. Cf. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d at 483, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240
N.Y.S.2d at 750-51 (discussing Ontario's interest in guest-host statute bar to recovery
in wrongful-death action). More likely, Massachusetts' policy may have been a remnant of the mistaken notion that at common law no action existed for wrongful death.
As the Rosenthal court recognized, it was not until 1972 that the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts recognized that the notion was mistaken. 475 F.2d at 445 (construing
Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60, 68, 284 N.E.2d 222, 229 (1972)). In any case, however, the Second Circuit considered Massachusetts' interest to be a true one; that is,
effectuation of the Massachusetts policy in New York federal and state courts would
impact upon the affairs of Massachusetts in a manner considered positive by the
Massachusetts legislature. Thus, it was only left to compare one state's interest to the
other's.
121. See Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 38-40, 172 N.E.2d 526,
527-28, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 134-36 (1961).
122. 475 F.2d at 445.
123. Id. at 445-46.
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wrongful death would outweigh any interest Massachusetts has in
keeping down in this limited type of situation the size of verdicts
(and in some cases insurance premiums)."' 124
Nevertheless, the Rosenthal decision was criticized as erroneous and possibly unconstitutional. 125 While it cannot be demonstrated with absolute certainty, it seems reasonable to conclude
that the results in Tjepkema and Rosenthal would have been different had they been tried in other fora. The New York plaintiff obtained not only the convenience of a New York forum, but also the
benefit of New York law which in all likelihood would not have
been applied by a forum which obtained jurisdiction because it had
greater contacts with the litigation. The dimension of the choice-oflaw problem in cases involving Seider attachments was addressed
in the debate over the viability of the Seider doctrine after Shaffer
v. Heitner. Several commentators believed the Seider attachment
to be consistent with the due process requirements of Shaffer only
if the availability of a local forum for a resident plaintiff did not automatically imply the appropriateness of a forum law.' 26 However,
this direct relationship, even if justified at the second level of analysis as an interest comparison, may in fact have been estab7
1

lished.

2

124. Id. at 445 (quoting Medinger v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., 6 A.D. 42, 46, 39
N.Y.S. 613, 616 (1896)). The opinion cannot be characterized solely as an interest
analysis. On the one hand, the fact that a New York citizen was plaintiff certainly implicates a state interest in that New York's wrongful-death policy serves to protect its
own citizens. On the other hand, however, the court minimized Massachusetts' interest in part by finding that the incident was not purely localized in Massachusetts because the decedent was from out of state and the defendant hospital was a national
one in terms of its patients, staff; and efforts to obtain out-of-state contributions. Id.
at 446. One might argue that if Massachusetts had an interest in keeping the cost of
in-state hospital care low, the above-mentioned factors would not lessen the validity
of that interest On these grounds, then, one might conclude that the Rosenthal court
was somewhat caught in the remnants of the contacts analysis used in jurisdictional
cases and sometimes suggested in choice-of-law cases. See note 111 supra.
125. E.g., Martin, supra note 113, at 227; Silberman, supra note 5, at 99.
126. E.g., Silberman, supra note 5, at 90-99; COLUMBIA Note, supra note 80,
at 446.
127. The second issue in O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d
Cir. 1978), see text accompanying notes 84-98 supra, was whether the district court
was correct in holding that the defendant's liability be determined by New York law.
The accident occurred in Virginia; under Virginia law no liability would exist. Under
New York law, liability would exist if negligence were established. 579 F.2d at 196.
The court determined that the New York Court of Appeals would apply New York
law:
[W]e see no indication that the highest court of New York has wavered in its
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Factoringin the Direct-Action Statute
Seider was first characterized as a judicially created directaction statute in Judge Keating's concurring opinion in Simpson v.
12 9
Loehmann 12 8 and later by the Second Circuit in Minichiello.
Both Judge Keating' 30 and the Second Circuit 13 1 cited Watson v.
Employers Liability Assurance Corp . 1 32 for the proposition that
New York's interest in applying its forum law to protect resident
plaintiffs paralleled those interests considered significant by the
Watson court. Thus, if the direct-action statute were constitutional,

the jurisdictional and choice-of-law problems would, per force, be
extinguished. 1 33 The question, however, particularly in light of
subsequent developments, 1 34 is whether there was a solid foundation for the analytical framework erected by those courts relying on

Watson.
A direct-action statute permits a plaintiff to bring an action directly against an insurance company. There are two general types

of direct-action statutes. New York, for example, permits direct action against the insurer where the plaintiff has obtained a judgment
against the insured remaining unsatisfied thirty days after its issuance. 135 Louisiana's statute permits an injured plaintiff to bring an
action directly against an insurer before he has obtained a judgdetermination to afford New York tort plaintiffs the benefit of New York law
more favorable than the law of lex loci delictus whenever there is a fair basis for doing so.
Id. at 205. This decision was criticized as "dangerously close to the constitutional
fairness line" and "probably erroneous." Silberman, supra note 5, at 99. Moreover,
Judge Friendly observed that the "same consequences would ensue if New York had
authorized a direct action on behalf of New York residents against insurers doing
business in New York," 579 F.2d at 206 n.18, thus pointing out the inadequacy of
dealing with Seider attachments as a jurisdictional issue only, and not a joint jurisdictional and choice-of-law issue. See text accompanying notes 222-226 infra.
128. 21 N.Y.2d at 313-14, 234 N.E.2d at 673, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 639-40 (Keating,
J., concurring).
129. 410 F.2d at 109-10.
130. 21 N.Y.2d at 313, 234 N.E.2d at 673, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 639 (Keating, J., concurring).
131. 410 F.2d at 109-10, adheredto en banc, 410 F.2d at 117-18 n.1.
132. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
133. Since the validity of the direct-action statute rests on the state's interest in
applying its own law, see id. at 72-73; text accompanying notes 154-157 infra, the
state court's decision to apply its forum law, as long as in conformance with the
direct-action statute, would necessarily meet due process standards.
134. See text accompanying notes 198-211 infra.
135. N.Y. INs. LAW § 169 (McKinney 1977).
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ment against the insured and is probably the broadest such statute
3 6

at present.1

Historically, if a plaintiff was successful in recovering a judgment against the assured but the assured was bankrupt or unable
to meet the judgment, the plaintiff could be denied compensation.
Courts held that under these circumstances the plaintiff had no action against the insurance company; he was not a party to the insurance contract and the policy was written for the benefit of the
insured, not persons whose injuries might give them a claim
against him.' 3 7 To correct this situation the Louisiana legislature
enacted a statute in 1918 which guaranteed an injured party his
right to recover from the liability insurer by providing a cause of
action directly against the insurance company where the insured
became insolvent or bankrupt before the injured party could obtain
or enforce a judgment against him. 138 This act was the forerunner
of the direct-action statute.
The Louisiana legislature expanded the 1918 law in 1930 to
produce what became known as the direct-action statute. This act
allowed the injured party to sue a liability insurer directly, before
the claim was reduced to a judgment against the insured; the plaintiff was given the options of bringing suit against either the insured, the insurance company, or against both the insured and the
insurance company jointly and severally. 139 The Louisiana Supreme
136. Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (West 1978) with R.I. GEN. LAWs
§ 27-7-1 (1979).
137. See, e.g., Bain v. Atkins, 181 Mass. 240, 63 N.E. 414 (1902).
138. The Act read in part:
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Louisiana, that

after the passage of this act, it shall be illegal for any company to issue a policy against liability unless it contains a provision to the effect that the insolvency or bankruptcy of the assured shall not release the company from the
payment of damages for injury sustained or loss occasioned during the life of
the policy, and, in case of such insolvency or bankruptcy, an action may be
maintained within the terms and limits of the policy by the injured person or
his or her heirs, against the insurer company.
1918 La. Acts, No. 253, § 1 (current version at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (West
1978)).
139. The Act read in part:
[Any judgment which may be rendered against the assured, for which the
insurer is liable, which shall have become executory, shall be deemed prima
facie evidence of the insolvency of the assured, and an action may thereafter
be maintained within the terms and limits of the policy by the injured person or his or her heirs against the insurer company within the terms, and
limits of the policy ... in the parish were the accident or injury occurred, or

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss1/7

26

Levin: Rush v. Savchuk: Is the Seider Spoiled or Just Getting Harder?

1980]

RUSH v. SAVCHUK: IS THE SEIDER SPOILED?

Court has interpreted the statute to permit direct action where the
accident occurs within the state or where the accident occurs out of
state if the policy was written or issued within the state. 140 Thus,
Louisiana's interest was not defined in terms of protecting injured
citizens, but instead in terms of injuries occuring within the state
and the regulation of insurers operating within the state.
The Watson Decision14 1 -Pursuant to the Louisiana statute,

Mr. and Mrs. Watson brought a direct action in Louisiana state
court claiming damages against the Employers Liability Assurance
Corporation (hereinafter Employers). Mrs. Watson claimed to have
been injured in Louisiana when she bought and used in that state a
Toni Home Permanent. 42 The manufacturer, the Toni Company of
Illinois, was a subsidiary of the Gillette Safety Razor Company,
which had its headquarters in Massachusetts. 143 The insurance policy sued on, which was negotiated and issued in Massachusetts and
delivered in Massachusetts and Illinois, contained a clause prohibiting direct actions against the insurance company until after final
determination of the obligations to pay damages. The clause was
recognized as binding and enforceable under both Massachusetts
and Illinois law. 14

The action was removed to federal district court by reason of
diversity. 145 Employers moved for dismissal, contending in perti146
nent part that the Louisiana statute contravened the due process
and full faith and credit clauses 147 of the Constitution. The district
court dismissed the case, holding the statutory provisions uncon-

in the parish where the assured has his domicile, and said action may be
brought either against the insurer company alone or against both the assured
and the insurer company, jointly and in solido.
1930 La. Acts, No. 55, § 1 (current version at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (West
1978)). For a detailed legislative history, see Esteve v. Allstate Ins. Co., 351 So.2d
117, 118-21 (La. 1977); Webb v. Zurich Ins. Co., 251 La. 558, 205 So.2d 398 (1967).
140. See Webb v. Zurich Ins. Co., 251 La. 558, 205 So.2d 398 (1967).
141. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
142. Id. at 67.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 67-68.
145. Id. at 69.
146. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see 348 U.S. at 69.
147. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see 348 U.S. at 69. Employers also contended that
the Louisiana statute violated the equal protection provision, U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, and contract clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. The Supreme Court ultimately
held these contentions "wholly void of merit." 348 U.S. at 70.
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stitutional as to policies written and delivered outside Louisiana. 148 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 1 49
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Employers argued that on
due process grounds "a state is without power to exercise 'extraterritorial jurisdiction,' that is, to regulate and control activities wholly
beyond its boundaries."' 150 Thus, Employers reasoned, the full faith
and credit clause compelled Louisiana to apply the "no-action" provision sanctioned by the laws of Massachusetts and Illinois. 15 1 The
appellee's argument was firmly based on the state-power concepts
of Pennoyer v. Neff. In rejecting Employer's analysis, the Supreme
Court went beyond these limiting jurisdictional principles. 152
The Court viewed the case in choice-of-law terms and combined
elements of both a contracts and interest analysis. On the former
foundation, the Court recognized that the interstate nature of business conducted by large corporations necessarily implicated the interests of any given number of states dependent upon the factual
153
circumstances involved.
The gravamen of the Court's analysis, however, was founded
upon interest terms.154 The Court stressed the fact that Louisiana,
whether through public or private assistance, would likely be re148. 107 F. Supp. 494 (W.D. La. 1952).
149. 202 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1953).
150. 348 U.S. at 70.
151. Id. at 69.
152. It is interesting to note here that Watson was decided in 1954 and the first
comprehensive long-arm statute was not enacted until 1955. See R. FIELD, D.
KAPLAN, & K. CLERMONT, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE

756 n.w. (4th ed. 1978).
153. The Court reasoned that
[s]ome contracts made locally, affecting nothing but local affairs, may
well justify a denial as other states of power to alter those contracts. But, as
this case illustrates, a vast part of the business affairs of this Nation does not
present such simple local situations. Although this insurance contract was issued in Massachusetts, it was to protect Gillette and its Illinois subsidiary
against damages on account of personal injuries that might be suffered by
users of Toni Home Permanents anywhere in the United States ....

As a

consequence of the modem practice of conducting widespread business activities throughout the entire United States, this Court has in a series of
cases held that more states than one may seize hold of local activities which
are part of multistate transactions and may regulate to protect interests of its
own people, even though other phases of the same transactions might justify
regulatory legislation in other states.
348 U.S. at 71-72.
154. It is the interest analysis of the Watson opinion which has been most frequently relied upon since. See, e.g., Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d at 110;
Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d at 313, 234 N.E.2d at 673, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 639
(Keating, J., concurring).
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quired to care for the injured. Further, the Court reasoned that
Louisiana had an interest in seeing that insurance companies were
ultimately liable to the extent of the policy issued for the purpose
of affording payment to injured individuals. Finally, the Court believed that the state had an interest in providing a forum convenient to those injured within its borders. 155 While the Court recognized Massachusetts' interest in the regulation of policies issued in
that state, it found this interest insufficient to compel Louisiana "to
subordinate its direct action provisions to Massachusetts contract
rules."156

The Court's analysis is reflective of a change in choice-of-law
157
thinking from territorial-power concepts to interest concepts.
However, the Court's opinion did not cite Mrs. Watson's Louisiana
residence as a paramount factor in the interest analysis. 158 Rather,
the Court articulated Louisiana's interests in terms of "liability
insurance that covers injuries to people in that State."' 159 In contrast, courts upholding the Seider attachment subsequent to both
Seider 160 and Shaffer161 continued to articulate New York's interest
in providing the protection of its forum law to its residents as an
integral part of the analysis.
Indeed, there are other significant differences between the
Seider attachment and the Watson direct action. The occurrence of
the accident outside the forum in a Seider action is not an insignificant difference; the Watson court was at pains to emphasize the
fact that the plaintiff suffered her injury within the forum. Furthermore, the Watson Court emphasized the multi-state activities of
Toni and Gillette, whose products were sold nationwide; in contrast, the characterization in Seider of the insurance company as
1
national is diaphanous.

62

This Note has identified the two most prominent features of
155. 348 U.S. at 72-73.
156. Id. at 73.
157. See text accompanying notes 107-111 supra.
158. In fact, in Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930), the Court concluded that "[t]he fact that Dick's permanent residence was in Texas is without significance. At all times here material, he was physically present and acting in Mexico.
Texas was, therefore, without power to affect the terms of contracts so made." Id. at
408.
159. 348 U.S. at 73.
160. E.g., Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d at 109-10, adhered to en banc,
410 F.2d at 117-18 n.1; Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d at 311, 234 N.E.2d at 672,
287 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
161. E.g., O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d at 195, 201; Baden v.
Staples, 45 N.Y.2d at 891, 383 N.E.2d at 111, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 809.
162. Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d at 112, 216 N.E.2d at 313, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
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the analysis in Seider and its progeny: the state's interest, with respect to both jurisdictional and choice-of-law questions, in protecting its residents, and the analogy of New York's interest in
Seider attachments to Louisiana's in the Watson case. These arguments were made both before and after Shaffer v. Heitner, and
without direct contradiction by the United States Supreme Court.
It was with these questions extant that the Court considered Rush
v. Savchuk l6 3 in 1980.
RUSH v. SAVCHUK

The Facts
After years of litigation in the state and federal courts of New
York, it was with some irony that the case which would decide the
validity of the Seider attachment arose in the Minnesota court system. On January 13, 1972, Jeffrey Savchuk was injured in a singlecar accident in Elkhart, Indiana. The car was driven by Randall
Rush and insured by the State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company (State Farm) under a liability policy issued in Indiana,
164
the residence of both parties.
Savchuk moved to Minnesota in June of 1973 and on May 28,
1974 commenced an action against Rush in Minnesota state court,
although Rush had no contacts with Minnesota that would support
jurisdiction.1 6 5 As Minnesota had adopted the Seider attachment
procedure (but not a direct-action procedure) by statute,168 and
163. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
164. Id. at 322.
165. Id. The complaint alleged negligence and sought $125,000 damages. Id. at
322-23. The plaintiff later reduced his claim to $50,000, the policy limit, a fact the
Minnesota Supreme Court considered to be an implicit recognition of the fact that
personal jurisdiction over the defendant was not justified. Savchuk v. Rush, 311
Minn. 480, 490, 245 N.W.2d 624, 629 (1976).
166. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 571.41(2) (West Supp. 1979) provides in relevant part:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein contained, a plaintiff in any
action in a court of record for the recovery of money may issue a garnishee
summons before judgment therein in the following instances only:
(b) If the court shall order the issuance of such summons, if a summons and
complaint is filed with the appropriate court and either served on the defendant or delivered to a sheriff for service on the defendant not more than
30 days after the order is signed, and if, upon application to the court it shall
appear that:
(2) The purpose of the garnishment is to establish quasi in rem jurisdiction
and that
(b) defendant is a nonresident individual, or a foreign corporation, partnership or association.
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State Farm did business in Minnesota, Savchuk sought quasi in
rem jurisdiction by garnishment of the insurer's obligations to defend and indemnify Rush.1 67 State Farm responded to the garnishment summons, claiming that nothing was due Rush as judgment
debtor. Savchuk then moved for permission to file a supplemental
complaint, making the garnishee, State Farm, a non-defendant
party to the action pursuant to the Minnesota garnishment statute. 16 8 Rush and State Farm then moved for dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction over the defendant. 1 69 The trial court granted Savchuk's motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint and
denied the motion to dismiss. The order was then appealed to the
1 70
Minnesota Supreme Court.
Savchuk I
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. The court first held that as a matter of state law an automobile insurance company's obligation to defend and indemnify its insured in a res subject to prejudgment garnishment for the purpose
of obtaining quasi in rem jurisdiction as long as the plaintiff is a
resident of Minnesota.17
The court then considered whether the seizure and resultant
quasi in rem jurisdiction conformed with constitutional requirements of due process. The court held that due process is not violated by the attachment procedure provided:
(1) [that] proper notice is given to the defendant-insured, adequate to give him opportunity to defend his property; (2) that
the defendant-insured's liability is limited to the applicable policy limits of his insurance contract; and (3) that the plaintiff in the
(3) The garnishee and the debtor are parties to a contract of the suretyship,
guarantee, or insurance, because of which the garnishee may be held to respond to any person for the claim asserted against the debtor in the main
action.
A version slightly different from that above was in effect at the time of the initial
Minnesota Supreme Court hearing in Savchuk, but differed in no material respect.
See 444 U.S. at 322 n.3.
167. 444 U.S. at 322.
168. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 571.51 (West Supp. 1979) provides in relevant part:
[I]n all... cases where the garnishee denies liability, the judgment creditor
may move the court at any time before the garnishee is discharged, on notice to both the judgment debtor and the garnishee, for leave to file a supplemental complaint making the latter a party to the action, and setting forth
the facts upon which he claims to charge him; and, if probable cause is
shown, such motion shall be granted....
169. 444 U.S. at 323-24.
170. Id. at 324.
171. 311 Minn. at 485, 245 N.W.2d at 627-28.
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action is a resident of the state at the time the action is com17 2
menced.
The court found that the first and third requirements were met.
The second requirement proved problematic. Because Minnesota
law did not allow the defendant a limited appearance for the purposes of quasi in rem actions, 173 the defendant claimed that he
would be subject to damages beyond the policy limits, that is, to
the extent of an in personam action.1 74 The court approved of the
solution utilized in Simpson v. Loehmann 1 75 and held that the bar
did not apply in this case. Just as basic fairness justified the attachment procedure, the court held, similar considerations mandated
that the procedure be restricted as to the potential recovery. 176
The court rested its due process requirements on the "[b]asic
considerations of fairness"'177 which provided the rationale for International Shoe and its progeny. Conceding that Rush had engaged in no activity which justified an assertion of personal jurisdiction, the court found that the due process requirements for
personal jurisdiction were not necessarily congruent with those for
the assertion of other types of jurisdiction. Rather, "considerations
of fairness suggest the need for quasi-in-rem jurisdiction obtainable
via a prejudgment garnishment procedure like that permitted
by' 1 78 the Seider rule. The court recognized that the insurer controls the defense.' 7 9 Minimum contacts sufficient to provide a constitutional basis for quasi in rem jurisdiction were found to exist
because of the insurer's registration to do business in the state,
presence in the state, and the state's "legitimate" interest in protecting its residents and providing them a forum. 180 However, at
the same time, the court commented that if the plaintiff were not a
resident of the forum state, the state would lack sufficient meaningful contact with the suit to justify the exercise of jurisdiction. 181
172. Id. at 488, 245 N.W.2d at 629. As Savcbuk was not a resident of Minnesota
at the time he was injured, the court interpreted the test to require residency at the
time of commencement of the suit. Id. at 486, 245 N.W.2d at 628.
173. MINN. STAT. ANN. RULES OF CIV. PRoc. R. 4.04(2) (West 1979) states that

"when quasi in rem jurisdiction has been obtained, a party defending such action
thereby submits personally to the jurisdiction of the court."
174. 311 Minn. at 486, 245 N.W.2d at 628.
175. See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra.
176. 311 Minn. at 486-87, 245 N.W.2d at 629.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 486 n.6, 245 N.W.2d at 628 n.6.
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This statement proves analytically weak. A large insurance
company such as State Farm is likely to do business in all fifty
states and the District of Columbia.'8 2 Yet, the necessary factor in
the court's decision was the plaintiff's forum residence. Thus, the
court's reasoning led to the anomalous result that sufficient contacts
to justify an exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction would be based on
the insurance company's presence in the forum only if the plaintiff
were a forum resident. Rush appealed to the United States Supreme Court which vacated the judgment and remanded the case
to the Minnesota Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of
83
Shaffer v. Heitner.'
Savchuk II
The Minnesota Supreme Court distinguished Shaffer and
upheld the attachment procedure as consistent with the minimum
contacts analysis made applicable by Shaffer to all assertions of jurisdiction.' 8 4 The court found the Seider-type attachment significantly different than that at issue in Shaffer. First, the sequestration procedure at issue in Shaffer did not parallel the asserted state
interest in regulation of the state-chartered corporations.' 8 5 In contrast, the Minnesota garnishment statute paralleled the state interest in facilitating recoveries for resident plaintiffs by providing a local forum.' 8 6 Indeed, satisfaction of the interest necessitated the
garnishment procedure.
Second, the res used in Shaffer to assert jurisdiction was completely unrelated to the cause of action. Again by way of contrast,
the res used in Seider-type attachments-the insurer's obligations
to defend and indemnify-are intimately related to the cause of action and are "inevitably the focus, determining the rights and obligation [sic] of the insurer, the insured, and practically speaking,
87
the victim."'
182. 444 U.S. at 330.
183. Rush v. Savchuk, 433 U.S. 902 (1977).
184. Savchuk v. Rush, 272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978).
185. Id. at 891; see text accompanying notes 72-78 supra. That interest would
be satisfied by application of Delaware law, but did not necessitate the provision of
a Delaware forum. 272 N.W.2d at 890.
186. Id. at 891.
187. Id. at 892. Another factor in the court's adherence to its initial decision
was the omission in the historical discussion in Shaffer of any discussion of the
Seider attachment-a procedure the Savchuk II court characterized as "undoubtedly
the most highly controversial and significant contemporary application of the doctrine of quasi in rem jurisdiction." Id. at 891. The court interpreted the omission of
any discussion of the Seider procedure as an indication that the Court at least did not
disapprove of the attachment procedure. The Savchuk II court also relied on the Su-

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1980

33

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 7
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9: 247

Having distinguished Shaffer, the court reiterated several of
the well-known fairness arguments cited in support of the Seider
attachment: the defendant's liability is limited and, in any case, he
stands to lose nothing of convertible value;' 88 inconvenience to defendants can be remedied by application of the doctrine of forum
non-conveniens;18 9 the action is essentially one against the insurer,
requiring only the nominal defendant's cooperation in his defense; i 90 and the overall effect serves to "minimize the traditional
'jurisdictional bias' in favor of the nominal defendant."' 9 '
However, by framing the issue primarily in jurisdictional terms,
the Minnesota Supreme Court camouflaged-and confused-a
serious choice-of-law problem. The issue in Savchuk was not merely
one of "fair forum," for Savchuk was barred from bringing suit1 in
92
Indiana (the place of the accident) by that state's guest statute.
The court's analysis was limited to its statement that "Minnesota's
legitimate interest in facilitating recoveries for resident plaintiffs
not only requires provision of a local forum, but may override traditional choice of law analysis."193 Clearly, Indiana had some interest in seeing its resident defendants protected in guest-host situations. Yet, a balancing of these interests was never undertaken by
the Minnesota court.
It is not uncommon in cases of true conflicts of interest for the
forum state to apply its own law. i 94 Unfortunately, the Minnesota
court neither compared the conflicting interests nor considered the
importance of Savchuk's place of residence at the time of the
accident. (Indeed, New York courts did not allow utilization of the
Seider procedure unless the plaintiff was a resident at the time of
the accident.' 95) Further, the Minnesota court argued that "[a]
state's interest in providing a forum for its residents is particularly
preme Court's earlier refusals to consider the constitutionality of the procedure. Id.
at 891 n.4. The Minnesota court was not alone in discussing this factor. Judge
Dooling displayed an even greater reliance in the district court opinion in O'Connor
v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 437 F. Supp. 994, 997 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 579 F.2d 194
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1034 (1978).

188. 272 N.W.2d at 892 & n.6 (quoting O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579
F.2d 194, 198 (2d Cir. 1978) and Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 117, 118 (2d
Cir. 1968) (en banc)).
189. Id. at 893.
190. Id. at 892.
191. Id. at893.
192. Id. at 891 n.5; see IND. CODE ANN. § 9-3-3-1 (Bums 1973).
193. 272 N.W.2d at 891-92 (citations omitted).
194. See, e.g., Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Or. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (194).
195. See Fish v. Bamby Bakers, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 511 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); Vaage v.
Lewis, 29 A.D.2d 315, 318, 288 N.Y.S.2d 521, 524-25 (2d Dep't 1968).
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strong where an alternative forum would not have permitted recovery," 196 thus justifying its jurisdictional holding in part on the possible outcome of an Indiana court's choice-of-law analysis. Thus, it
was clear that the Minnesota court's approach to the jurisdictional
question obviated any need to consider further the choice-of-law
problems involved. Rush appealed once again to the Supreme
Court. 197

The Supreme Court Opinion
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Marshall, put an
end to the long-standing assertion that Seider attachments were a
justifiable exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction. The court's analysis
was premised on its holding in Shaffer-that " 'all assertions of
state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny.' "198 In
determining whether those standards are met, the Court required
that the inquiry focus on "' the relationship among the defendant,
the forum, and the litigation.' "199
The Court first found that there existed no contacts between
Rush and Minnesota, a conclusion the state court had also
reached. 20 0 The Court then considered the significance of the "contact" provided by the presence of the debt-the obligation to defend and indemnify2 0L-vithin the forum. The Court concluded
that:
State Farm's decision to do business in Minnesota was completely adventitious as far as Rush was concerned. He had no
control over that decision, and it is unlikely that he would have
expected that by buying insurance in Indiana he had subjected
himself to suit in any State to which a potential future plaintiff
might decide to move. In short, it cannot be said that the defendant engaged in any purposeful activity related to the forum
that would make the exercise of jurisdiction fair, just, or reason20 2
able, merely because his insurer does business there.
196. 272 N.W.2d at 891 n.5.
197. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 325 (1980).

198. Id. at 327 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 212).
199. Id. (quoting 433 U.S. at 204).
200. Id. at 327-28; see 311 Minn. at 487, 245 N.W.2d at 629 (Savchuk I).
201. The Court assumed that the debt was garnishable property because state
law controlled. Thus, the question whether the debt arose before or after jurisdiction
was obtained over the defendant was not answered. As to the relevance of the garnishment, the Court held that "the question is what significance that fact has to the
relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation." 444 U.S. at 328
n.14.
202. 404 U.S. at 328-29 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). But see id. at
304 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Having found no contacts between the defendant and the litigation, the Court next examined the relationship between the forum and the litigation. The Court found that the State's interest in
the insurance policy, to whatever extent it existed, was irrelevant
because it related only to the conduct of litigation properly commenced. Because the insurance policy was neither the subject matter of the tort claim, nor related to the operative facts of the asserted negligence, it could provide no substantive ties between the
20 3
forum and the litigation.
The Court briefly examined the direct-action rationale for
upholding Seider attachments. Its conclusion was based squarely
on its requirement that the focus of jurisdictional analysis be on the
named defendant. Thus, the Court held that "[tihe State's ability
to exert its power over the 'nominal defendant' is analytically prerequisite to the insurer's entry into the case as a garnishee."2 0 4
The opinion did not, however, consider the validity of a legislative
direct action enacted to cover Seider-type situations.20 5
The precedential value of the Court's Savchuk opinion lies in
its statement that due process requires the jurisdictional inquiry to
focus on "the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and
the litigation [and not on] that among the plaintiff, the forum, the
insurer, and the litigation." 20 6 International Shoe can logically be
interpreted as either a minimum-contacts test or a "fair play and
substantial justice" test. 20 7 The Savchuk Court settled any question
on this matter by holding that a finding of minimum contacts is analytically prerequisite to a consideration of whether "fair and substantial justice" is served--or offended-by an assertion of jurisdiction based on those minimum contacts. 208 The flaw, then, in the
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 329.
Id. at 330-31.
Some guidance might be provided by the Court's footnote reference to the

direct-action statute upheld in Watson as "applicable only if the accident or injury
occurred in the State or the insured was domiciled there and which permitted the
plaintiff to sue the insurer alone, without naming the insured as a defendant." Id. at
331 n.19 (emphasis added); see text accompanying note 140 supra.
206. 444 U.S. at 332. That Seidir courts had limited such actions to forum residents on the ground that permitting nonresidents to avail themselves of the procedure would violate due process was viewed by the Court as support for its conclusion that those courts had substituted plaintiff's contacts for those of the defendant in
the jurisdictional calculus. Id.
207. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)); see 444 U.S. at 300 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
208. 444 U.S. at 332.
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opinions written by those courts upholding the Seider procedure
was a predilection to view the overall fairness of the assertion of jurisdiction as the determinative factor. The Supreme Court's return
to or reaffirmance of, the emphasis on the defendant will likely
simplify jurisdictional analysis. Thus, the confusion evident, for example, in the Minnesota Supreme Court's second Savchuk opinion,
a confusion which considered the ultimate choice-of-law determination as a factor in the jurisdictional decision, 20 9 will be avoided in
the future. But if the simplicity of the Court's analysis has its benefits, it also has its flaws. By taking a small step backward 2 10 to the
"magical and medieval concepts of presence and power"2 11
that
typified the Pennoyer era, the Court necessarily left at least two
questions unresolved, questions that are unlikely to remain forever
dormant.
Problems PersistingPost-SAVCHUK
The Supreme Court's Savchuk opinion was narrowly framed in
terms of quasi in rem jurisdiction. While it is not the purpose here
to suggest that the Court should have considered the two issues
that remain (direct actions in the Seider context and potentially resultant choice-of-law problems), the Court's analysis, by limiting
the initial focus to the defendant's contacts, allowed the Court to
avoid consideration of these questions. Should any state attempt to
legislate around the Savchuk opinion, that opinion will lose its
value because of its self-imposed limits.
Those courts which sustained the Seider procedure as in effect
a judicially created direct action statute considered the difference
between the quasi in rem action and the direct action to be one of
form only.2 12 Several courts 2 13 and commentators 2 14 who believed
209.

See text accompanying notes 192-196 supra.

210. See 444 U.S. at 308 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
211. Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d at 311, 234 N.E.2d at 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d
at 637.

212. See, e.g., Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d at 106, 112, adhered to en bane,
410 F.2d 117, 117-18 n." (2d Cir. 1968); O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 437 F.
Supp. 994 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 579 F.2d 194, 200 (2d Cir. 1978); Baden v. Staples,
45 N.Y.2d 889, 892, 383 N.E.2d 110, 111, 410 N.Y.S.2d 808, 810 (1978); Donawitz v.
Danek, 42 N.Y.2d 138, 142, 366 N.E.2d 253, 255, 397 N.Y.S.2d 592, 595 (1977). The
dissenting Justices in Savehuk also considered the difference to be of form only. See
444 U.S. at 304 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 333-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
213. E.g., Esteve v. Allstate Ins. Co., 351 So.2d 117, 120 (La. 1977); Kirchman
v. Mikula, 258 So.2d 701, 703 (La. App. 1972).
214. E.g., Rosenberg, One Procedural Genie Too Many or Putting Seider Back
into its Bottle, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 660, 669-87 (1971); HOFSTRA Note, supra note 80,
at 44.
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Seider to be unconstitutional nevertheless also believed that a legislature could constitutionally enact a direct-action statute incorporating Seider. The Supreme Court's analysis, because it focused on
the quasi in rem basis, provides little guidance in considering the
215
constitutionality of such a statute.
A corporation is considered to be "present" for jurisdictional
purposes wherever it does business, and is considered to be anenable to suit on a cause of action unrelated to its presence in the
forum. 2 16 However, the Savchuk Court may have hinted that

jurisdiction-even in personam-is more limited in the Seider circumstance by referring to the situs of the insurer's obligation in the
forum state as a legal fiction compounding "the legal fiction that a
corporation is 'present,' for jurisdictional purposes, wherever it
does business." 217 Under a direct-action statute incorporating
Seider the only affiliation with the forum, beside the presence of
the insurance company, is the residence of the plaintiff. Conceivably, a court could find that the insurance company's activities of
defending and indemnifying nonresidents of the forum state has no
relation to the regulable activities which the insurer carries on
within the forum. Thus, since there would be no relationship between the underlying substantive claim and the state's regulatory
interest, the direct-action statute could be overturned. Such a
holding would be consistent with the emphasis in Savchuk on the
relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.21 8

215.

Such a statute might read:

A resident of (State X) who while outside his state, sustains bodily injury, including fatal injury, and/or property damage as a result of the tortious

act of a person (including corporations) insured against liability for such injury or damage, shall have a right of action directly against the insurer, re-

gardless of any contrary provision in the insurance contract, provided that
the insurer has qualified to do business, or is doing business in this state.

See Rosenberg, supra note 214, at 670.
216. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 316.
217. 444 U.S. at 328. Some courts that have sustained Seider have argued that
the multistate nature of the insurer goes to minimize the traditional bias in favor of
the defendant. E.g., Savchuk v. Rush, 272 N.W.2d at 892. This characterization is in-

correct for two reasons: First, while the insurer is a large multistate corporation, it
has not through any of its activities caused injury to the plaintiff. Second, the rever-

sal of the "prodefendant bias" is less supportable where the plaintiff's activities are
multistate. See Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1168 (1966). By the very fact of the plaintiff hav-

ing been injured outside the forum state, the plaintiff has engaged in "multistate
activity."
218.

444 U.S. at 332.
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The Court's decision upholding Louisiana's direct-action statute in Watson provides little support for the constitutionality of a
Seider-type direct action. First, the occurrence of the injury in
Louisiana settled the jurisdictional question.2 19 Second, the de2 20
fendant's conduct in Watson was the cause of injury.
Nonetheless, the Savchuk Court's only reference to Watson indicated that the direct action would be allowed "if the accident or injury occurred in the State or the insured was domiciled there and
[the statute] permitted the plaintiff to sue the insurer alone....
Thus, the Court's lone statement concerning the in personam validity of the direct action would appear to allow a statutory direct
action where the only relationship is the insured's residence, thus
parrying the reality that the defendant in a direct action, upon
whom the burdens of litigation would fall, is the insurer.
Were the Seider-type direct action upheld, serious choice-oflav problems would arise. Savchuk presented a particularly egregious choice-of-law decision. While the effect of the holding in
Rosenthal v. Warren was to subject the defendant to greater liability than lex loci delictus would have mandated, 22 2 the defendant in
Savchuk was subject to liability where none would have existed
had the Indiana guest statute been applied. 22 3 The Minnesota Supreme Court did not attempt to balance its interests with those of
Indiana.2 24 Instead, it premised its jurisdictional and choice-of-law
holdings upon the same factors. 2 25 Since the jurisdictional holding
was overruled by the Supreme Court, the validity of the choice-oflaw result is open to question. Whether the Minnesota approach to
choice of law in Savchuk would serve as precedent should jurisdic-

219. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. at 72-73.
220. Id. at 67; see text accompanying notes 154-162.
221. 444 U.S. at 331 n.19.
222. 475 F.2d 438, 439-40 (2d Cir. 1973); see text accompanying notes 114-124
supra.
223. See text accompanying notes 192-196 supra.
224. A compelling argument can be made for the application of Indiana law on
the facts of Savchuk. The accident occurred on an Indiana highway, both parties
were residents of Indiana at the time of the accident, the car was registered in
Indiana, and the insurance policy was issued in Indiana. 444 U.S. at 322. Indiana has
a significant interest in application of its guest-host statute to protect resident defendants, to spread the cost of such accidents among guests and hosts, and to influence the cost of automobile liability insurance. By contrast, Minnesota's interest to provide recovery for those who became residents after an accident seems
substantially less compelling.
225. See 272 N.W.2d at 891-92 (Savchuk II).
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tion be upheld under a direct-action statute directly raises the
question whether direct actions should constitutionally be permitted to provide not only fora for resident plaintiffs but also forum law.

226

By structuring its Savchuk opinion so narrowly in terms of
quasi in rem jurisdiction, the Supreme Court did not deal with the
challenge to choice-of-law analysis. Once the assertion of jurisdiction was determined to be unconstitutional, the problem of
Minnesota's aggressive and probably unconstitutional application of
forum law became moot. It has been observed that the Supreme
Court's recent decisions redefining jurisdiction move toward the provision of proper law in the proper forum. 2 27 Nevertheless, the
to utilize in
Court provided little in terms of guidelines for a court2 28
determining whether its choice of law is constitutional.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's overruling of the Seider doctrine in
Rush v. Savchuk signals the end of an era. Several important issues
226. The Court has consistently held jurisdiction and choice of law to be analytically distinct. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978); Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253-54 (1958).
In these cases the Court has held state-court jurisdiction violative of due process because minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum were lacking, but it
has commented in dicta that the interests asserted by the forum would probably be
sufficient to sustain the forum's decision to apply its own law. The Court has spoken
directly to only jurisdictional interests; yet, to imply that two states with conflicting
law each have sufficient interests to support the choice of its law but only one has
sufficient contacts to support jurisdiction is to decide in many fora which state's law
will apply to the controversy. See, e.g., Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Or. 1, 395 P.2d
543 (1964). The Court's logic has produced the anomaly that a state needs a higher

degree of contact to sustain jurisdiction than it does to support application of its law.
See Silberman, supra note 5, at 84-88; Vernon, Single-FactorBases of In Personam
Jurisdiction-A Speculation on the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978 WAsH. U.L.Q.
273, 292-93.

227. Hay, The Interrelationof Jurisdictionand Choice of Law in United States
Conflicts Law, 28 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 161, 183 (1979) (construing Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) and Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978)).
228. The Court adverted, in a footnote, 444 U.S. at 325 n.8, to the fact that
Minnesota would decline to apply the Indiana guest statute and would apply its own
comparative negligence law rather than Indiana's contributory negligence rule but
concluded that the constitutionality of a choice-of-law rule was not before the Court.
The Court then cited to Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930), where it had
held under facts similar to Seider that the decision to apply forum law where the
only affiliating factor was the plaintiff's permanent residence was violative of due
process. 444 U.S. at 325 n.8.
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have been settled. A person who is injured out of state and is
unable to secure personal jurisdiction over the tortfeasor will not
be permitted a local forum. The confusion concerning application
of the principles of International Shoe to Seider attachments, a

confusion that existed both before and after Shaffer v. Heitner, has
been laid to rest. It is now clear that these principles apply to all
assertions of jurisdiction, regardless of the rationale, and that the
relationship between the defendant and the forum must play a paramount role in jurisdictional analysis. Interestingly enough, the
post-Seider jurisprudence, which first discredited the concepts
traceable to Pennoyer v. Neff, has now allowed a touch of the old
"magic" through the back door.
The Savchuk decision may, however, have a very short life.
While one can only speculate whether a state will attempt to
achieve the objectives of the Seider attachment by the enactment
of a direct-action statute incorporating that procedure, it is clear
that the interests served by the judicial decision could be equally
well served by a legislative decision. Neither the Savchuk opinion
nor previous Court decisions concerning direct-action and choiceof-law issues provides much guidance in assessing the potential
statute's constitutionality on either ground. 229 Thus, after fourteen years of interesting confusion, an area of law already muddled
to excess remains unsettled.
Emily Hermanson Levin
229.

On January 13, 1981, the Supreme Court announced its decision in

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 49 U.S.L.W. 4071 (U.S. 1981). While it would be inappropriate here to discuss the importance of that decision, it should be noted that the decision provides no explicit guidance for analysis of the conflicts-of-law problems inherent in Seider-type attachments. The majority opinion in Hague relied on
significantly greater contacts than those present in the cases discussed in this Note,
see id. at 4075-76, in upholding the choice of law at question as constitutional. In
limiting its decision to the facts, id. at 4073, the Court necessarily did not provide
guidance for the Seider-type situation should it arise in the form of a direct action.
For a thorough discussion of choice of law after Hague, see the symposium at 10
HOFSTRA L. REv. 1 (forthcoming, 1981).
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